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as to the scope of the Holland decision.28 It remains to be seen
whether the Cuthbert opinion has finalized the requirement of proof
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and also whether the lack of
uniformity among circuits will result in a further clarification of
this area by the Supreme Court of the United States.
KENNETH H. MACKAY, JR.

TRANSFER OF THE MORTGAGEE'S INTEREST
IN FLORIDA
When the law of assignment and the concept of negotiability are
combined in the transfer of a mortgagee's interest in real property,
they conflict and confusion abounds. Fine distinctions can be made
and endless conceptualistic arguments can be waged in order to justify a particular result. Diverse judicial opinion and the uncertain
position of the parties to such a transaction led the Florida Legislature to enact a statute' to control assignments of real property mortgages. Unfortunately, the statute is not explicit in certain respects, and
the decisions since its enactment have not clarified these uncertain
areas. The purpose of this note is to outline some principles of the
law of mortgage assignment in an effort to determine the present
state of the Florida law.
A mortgagee of real property acquires two rights: (1) the personal obligation of the mortgagor, or the debt, evidenced by a negotiable or non-negotiable note or a bond, and (2) the mortgage or
security for the performance of the personal obligation. The mortgage
cannot come into being without the existence of the debt or obligation.2 Thus as a general proposition the debt and the security for
the debt cannot be separated. An attempted assignment of the mortgage, apart from the debt secured, has been held to confer no legal
rights on the assignee.3
This duality of interest has often been expressed by language to
the effect that the mortgage debt is the principal and the hold upon
28. See Lattanzio v. United States, 243 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1957). But see United
States v. McKee, 220 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1955).
1. Fla. Laws 1915, ch. 6909, §1, now FLA. STAT. §701.02 (1959).
2. In re Derrico, 90 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Surr. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 615,
107 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1951). But see Garretson Inv. Co. v. Arndt, 144 Cal.
64, 77 Pac. 770 (1904); Halderman v. Woodward, 22 Kan. 512 (1879).
3. Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271 (1872); Jordan v. Sayre, 24 Fla.
1, 3 So. 329 (1888).
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the land is the incident, 4 or the accessory. 5 The courts, in applying
this principal-incident rule, hold that an assignment of the debt also
operates as an assignment of the mortgage, 6 which can be enforced
just as effectively as if it had been acquired by a formal written assignment.7 Some authorities hold that title to the mortgage remains
in the mortgagee as trustee for his assignee, even though the assignee
was unaware of the existence of the mortgage at the time of the
assignment.8 When the assignee discovers that a mortgage exists he
may affirm the trust and enforce the security. This rule is applicable
to equitable as well as legal mortgages. 9
THE POSITION OF THE ASSIGNEE

Two divergent views have been developed to determine the defenses that may be asserted against an assignee who attempts to foreclose on the mortgage or sue on the note. The pivotal question to be
answered is whether the assignee holds the note and mortgage as a
holder in due course or merely as an assignee.
The majority rule is founded upon the principal-debt doctrine.
The debt, as the principal, has the effect of imparting its own
characteristics to the mortgage, and the assignee takes the security as
he does the note. In the leading case of Carpenter v. Longan the
United States Supreme Court stated that "all authorities agree that
the debt is the principal and the mortgage the accessory. Equity puts
the principal and accessory upon a footing of equality and gives the
assignee of the evidence of the debt the same rights in regard to
both."' 0 This theory has been asserted by almost every court that has
adopted the majority rule,"" but it is not the only argument that sup-

4. E.g., Warren v. Seminole Bond & Mtg. Co., 127 Fla. 107, 172 So. 696 (1937);
Pensacola State Bank v. McClure, 67 Fla. 289, 64 So. 1022 (1914); McClure v.
American Nat'l Bank, 67 Fla. 32, 64 So. 427 (1914).
5. E.g., Evins v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank, 80 Fla. 84, 85 So. 659 (1920); cases
cited note 4 supra.
6. Florida Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Brown, 47 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1949); cases
cited note 3 supra.
7. Miami Mtg. & Guar. Co. v. Drawdy, 99 Fla. 1092, 127 So. 323 (1930); Collins
v. W. C. Briggs, Inc., 98 Fla. 422, 123 So. 833 (1929).
8. Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32, 14 N.E. 863 (1888); Steward v. Welch, 84 Me.
308, 24 Ad. 860 (1892). See also Clark v. Havard, 122 Ga. 273, 50 S.E. 108 (1905);
Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 Minn. 354, 247 N.W. 245 (1933).
9. Pitman v. Walker, 187 Cal. 667, 203 Pac. 739 (1922); Muldowney v. McCoy
Hotel Co., 223 Wis. 62, 269 N.W. 655 (1936).
10. 83 u.s. (16 Wall.) 271, 275 (1872).
11. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 62 Iowa 42, 17 N.W. 165 (1883); Hagerman
v. Sutton, 91 Mo. 519, 45 S.W. 73 (1887); First Nat'l Bank v. Flath, 10 N.D. 281, 86
N.W. 867 (1901).
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ports the majority position. 12
Under the majority view an assignee of a mortgage securing a
negotiable note who takes the assignment in good faith and before
maturity is free from all personal defenses and equities existing between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 13 The mortgage itself is not
negotiable, but as an incident to a negotiable instrument it partakes
of its negotiable characteristics. On the other hand, if the mortgage
secures a non-negotiable note, the assignee takes it subject to all
the defenses, both legal and equitable,14 that the mortgagor had
against the mortgagee at the time of the assignment."5
The minority view takes the position that a mortgage under all
circumstances, whether securing negotiable or non-negotiable instruments, is to be treated in the same manner as an ordinary chose in
action.6 Under this view the assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor in every case, just as the assignee of a mortgage securing a
non-negotiable note does under the majority view.
THE FLORIDA LAW OF MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENTS

The Florida law as to the rights of an assignee of a mortgage is in
substantial accord with the weight of authority. The assignee of a
mortgage securing a non-negotiable note takes subject to all of the
equities that would have been effective against the mortgagee at the
time of the mortgage or that arose before notice to the mortgagor of
the assignment.' 7 The theory behind this rule is further supported
in Florida by the fact that an assignment of a mortgage is not a conveyance or a transfer of legal title to the land covered by the mortgage.' 8 The mortgagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee has only
an equitable interest or a lien against the property. Since the legal
title to the mortgaged land is not in the mortgagee, the assignee is
on notice that he is buying an inchoate title imperfect on its face. The
12. One supporting reason is that the assignee is entitled to protection according to the contract obligation undertaken by the mortgagor. See Crawford v.
Aultman & Co., 189 Mo. 262, 270, 40 S.W. 952, 954 (1897); Logan v. Smith, 62
Mo. 455, 459 (1876). Another is the desire to make the rights of the assignee at
law on the note coextensive with his rights in equity on the mortgage. See Carpenter v. Longan, 88 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 276 (1872).
18. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY §1057 (8th ed. 1928).
14. In re McElmurray, 47 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.S.C. 1942); Enstrom v. Dunning,
186 Fla. 253, 186 So. 806 (1939).
15. Dulin v. Hunter, 98 Ala. 589, 13 So. 801 (1898); First Nat'l Bank v.
Brotherton, 78 Ohio St. 162, 84 N.E. 794 (1908).
16. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY §1068 (8th ed. 1928).
17. Meyerson v. Boyce, 97 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1957); Florida Land Holding Corp.
v. McMillen, 185 Fla. 481, 186 So. 188 (1988).
18. Garrett v. Fernauld, 68 Fla. 484, 57 So. 671 (1912).
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assignee, therefore, takes only what his assignor can convey, or that
which his assignor can call upon a court of equity to require the
holder of the legal title to convey to him.19
In absence of estoppel, since the assignee does not acquire the
legal title to the land, he is not protected as a bona fide purchaser
and he is subject to all of the countervailing equities that the right
to enforce the lien was subject to in the hands of his assignor. The
20
Florida Supreme Court, in Bauman v. Peacock, stated:
"Thus, only equitable interests being involved in this case, the
rule protecting a bona fide purchaser has no application because the protection of that rule extends only to those purchasing a legal title. An equitable interest ordinarily is taken with
all its imperfections and outstanding equities; and other things
being equal, between persons having equitable interests only,
the equity prior in point of time prevails."
In a transfer of a mortgage securing a negotiable instrument the
Florida law seems to be in general agreement with the majority view.
The Florida Court in the early case of Scott v. Taylor stated: "A
mortgage executed as security for the payment of a negotiable promissory note is a mere incident of and ancillary to such note ...
[Tlhe rights of the parties thereto, as well as of third persons, are
governed by the rules relating to negotiable paper ...- *"21 This position was reaffirmed by the Court in a more elaborate statement in
22
a later case:
"The rule best supported by reason and authority and
adopted in the majority of the states, is that, inasmuch as the
mortgage is a mere incident to the indebtedness, an assignee
for value before maturity of negotiable promissory note secured by mortgage, is entitled to the same privileges and immunity with respect to an action to foreclose the mortgage, to
which he would be entitled in an action on the note. He takes
good title and is free from all those defenses, which would not
be valid against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument."

19. Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928).
20. 80 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 1955). See also Haimovitz v. Robb, 130 Fla. 844,
178 So. 827 (1939); Myers v. Van Buskirk, supra note 19.
21. 63 Fla. 612, 618, 58 So. 30, 31 (1912); cf. Barlow v. Stevens, 112 Fla. 57,
150 So. 245 (1933).
22. Mullan v. Bank of Pasco, 101 Fla. 1097, 1115, 133 So. 323, 330 (1931). See
also Downing v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1955); Taylor v. American
Nat'l Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912) (citing Carpenter v. Longan).
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EFFECT OF THE FLORIDA ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE STATUTE

If the character of the note secured by the mortgage determines
the rights of the assignee, what effect does the Florida mortgage assignment statute have on a transfer of the mortgagee's interest? This
23
statute reads in part:
"No assignment of a mortgage upon real property or of any
interest therein, shall be good or effectual in law or equity,
against creditors or subsequent purchasers, for a valuable consideration, and without notice, unless the same be recorded
according to law."
There have been very few cases construing this statute, and therefore its applicability is uncertain. The statute was originally enacted
in 1915. Two cases decided just prior to its enactment may have influenced, if they were not the sole impetus for, its passage.
In Garrett v. Fernauld24 the mortgagee assigned his note and
mortgage before maturity to one Fernauld. Thereafter the mortgagee
canceled the mortgage on record without authority. Garrett then
purchased the mortgaged land from the mortgagor and paid the
mortgagee the amount of the mortgage without attempting to pick
up the negotiable notes it secured. Upon suit by Fernauld to foreclose the Court held that he was entitled to foreclosure, since the loss
resulted from Garrett's failure to demand surrender of the note or to
ascertain the holder of the mortgage when he paid the mortgagee.
The Court also stated that since an assignment is not a conveyance
or a transfer of an interest in land, the general recording statute25 was
inapplicable and therefore the assignee had no duty to record.
Another pre-assignment statute case is Northup v. Reese,2 6 which
dealt with two assignees of the same mortgagee. The owner of the
land gave a mortgage securing a negotiable promissory note to the
mortgagee, who recorded it and on the same day assigned it to Northup. Later the mortgagee took another negotiable note and mortgage
on the same land from the subsequent purchaser of the land. He
then, without authority, canceled on the record the first note and
mortgage that was held by assignee Northup and assigned the second
note and mortgage to Reese, the complainant.
The Court held that since an assignment was not required to be
recorded, an unauthorized cancellation of the record, in absence of
estoppel, did not destroy the lien of the unsatisfied mortgage. The

23. FLA. STAT. §701.02 (1959).
24. 63 Fla. 434, 57 So. 671 (1912).
25. Now FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1959).
26. 68 Fla. 451, 67 So. 136 (1914).
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labels "bona fide purchaser," "bona fide holder," and "bona fide
assignee" were used interchangeably by the Court in its discussion of
the assignees' interests.
To prevent results similar to Garrett and Northup, and to clarify
the law of mortgage assignments in Florida, the legislature required
all mortgage assignments to be recorded in order to be effectual
against "creditors or subsequent purchasers." However, the words
subsequent purchasers contemplate the transfer of a legal interest
rather than the equitable interest normally associated with an assignment of a chose in action. If the term is construed in this narrow
sense, a subsequent purchaser of land from the mortgagor [Garrett
case] is protected from an unrecorded assignment; but a subsequent
assignee of the mortgagee [Northup case] is not protected.
By implication from the loose references made to the assignee's
interests in Northup, the term subsequent purchasers could be construed to include subsequent assignees. This would allow a bona
fide subsequent assignee who found no previously recorded assignment to prevail over a prior assignee who failed to record. To support this position a logical argument can be made that an assignee of
a mortgage securing a negotiable note is in fact synonymous with a
bona fide purchaser. Since a negotiable instrument is not only written evidence of a contract but also a species of property, the bona
fide purchaser doctrine applies to negotiable instruments.27 A holder
of a negotiable note secured by a mortgage has legal title thereto; and,
therefore, whether he is called a holder in due course of the note or
an assignee of the mortgage, he still takes as a bona fide purchaser.
The foregoing argument would be of little value, however, if the
note embodied in the mortgage were non-negotiable. As previously
stated, an assignee of a non-negotiable note takes only an equitable
interest. His rights are determined by equitable principles. The
Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an assignee of a
non-negotiable chose in action is not a bona fide purchaser, since only
equitable interests are involved.28 Therefore, the word assignee has
a definitely established legal connotation. To include assignees in
the term subsequent purchasers would be totally inconsistent with
the well-established principle that the first assignee in point of time
prevails even without recording. Consequently, if the legislature had
intended to include "assignees" of the mortgagee in the statute, it
2
would have included them expressly.

9

Thus it seems that the statute requires the assignee of a non-nego27.

BRrrrON, BILLS AND NOTES

407-08 (1943).

28. E.g., Bauman v. Peacock, 80 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1955); Haimovitz v. Robb, 130
Fla. 844, 178 So. 827 (1939).
29. See Note, 7 U. FLA. L. REy. 93 (1954).
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tiable or negotiable debt to record to protect himself from creditors
of and subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. However, subsequent assignees of the mortgagee, if the debt is evidenced by a nonnegotiable note, probably do not come under the purview of the
statute because such an assignee cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser of a "legal interest."
Although the foregoing is only speculation, inasmuch as there
are no Florida cases directly endorsing either of the conclusions that
have been suggested, several cases decided after enactment of the
statute seem to indicate that subsequent assignees are protected.
In Manufacturers' Trust Co. v. People's Holding Co.30 a grantee
of property subject to a mortgage sought to execute a second mortgage. The prospective mortgagee insisted on satisfaction of the first
note and mortgage. This was done even though the original mortgagee
had previously assigned the note and mortgage. This assignment was
never recorded. The Court held that under the mortgage assignment
recording statute the second mortgagee was entitled to rely on the
record and was not required to inquire outside it to ascertain the
whereabouts of the first note and mortgage. Because the prior mortgage was not recorded, the second mortgagee was given priority over
the holder of the first note and mortgage.
The applicability of the statute to this type of factual setting was
made dear. The Court pointed out that the statute was undoubtedly
enacted to remedy the infirmity in the law pointed out by the Garrett
case and "similar decisions."' 3 1 To what similar decisions was the
Court referring? While the Garrett case dealt with a subsequent
grantee of the mortgaged land and in the Manufacturers' Trust Co.
case a subsequent mortgagee was involved, it is not improbable that
the similar decisions referred to by the Court were cases such as Northup v. Reese. Although Northup involved two mortgages given to the
same mortgagee, the same reasoning employed there could be applied
with equal force to successive assignees of the same mortgage.
The case of Bradley v. Forbs32 can be used to substantiate the
view that an assignee must record his assignment not only to be protected from grantees of the mortgaged premises and subsequent mortgagees of the same property but also from creditors and subsequent assignees of the original mortgagee. In this case an original mortgage
was given to the mortgagee, Green, and it was recorded. After the
debt was in default Green assigned the note and mortgage to Forbs.
Forbs did not record this assignment. Later a second mortgage was
given by the same mortgagor to one Drewery while the first mortgage
30. 110 Fla. 451, 149 So. 5 (1933).
31. Id. at 455, 149 So. at 7.
32. 116 Fla. 350, 156 So. 716 (1934).
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was still unsatisfied on record. Drewery foreclosed, and Bradley became the purchaser at the execution sale.
Forbes then brought suit to foreclose his mortgage. Bradley contended that his lien was prior to that of the holder of the unrecorded
assignment from mortgagee Green, and relied on the assignment re33
cording statute. The Court rejected this contention, saying:
"This statute has no application in this case because there was
no subsequent purchaser of the mortgage from Green and no
creditor of Green involved in this suit.
"It is true that the note and mortgage were purchased by
Leonard Forbs from Green after maturity and, therefore, any
defense which might have been made against Green, had he
held and attempted to foreclose the mortgage, could likewise
be made against Leonard Forbs; but, in the state of the record
which we find here it appears that the Chancellor duly considered this phase of the case and rendered his decree accordingly. If Green had satisfied the Forbs mortgage of record,
then there is no room for question that such satisfaction would
have been protected in the absence of the record of the assignment of the mortgage and note, but this is not the case."
Although this quotation is clearly dictum, it nevertheless presents a
strong indication that the statute would probably be held to apply
in a case involving a creditor of or a subsequent purchaser from a
mortgagee.
If the Court does eventually hold that the statute is applicable to
purchasers of the mortgagee's interest, what will be the result when
the mortgagee makes successive assignments of the same negotiable
debt secured by the same mortgage? It is clear that if the first assignee
or purchaser does not record, a second good faith assignee will be
protected by the statute and take the mortgage and the note as a
holder in due course.
Assume that the first purchaser records his mortgage assignment
and a second assignment of the same negotiable debt is made by the
mortgagee. Under negotiable instrument law the status of the second
assignee-holder of the note as a holder in due course will not be affected by the constructive notice imputed by the recording statute.3 4
Hence he could rely solely on the note as a holder in due course, sue
at law, and obtain execution against the general assets of the mortgagor, excluding the land subject to the perfected mortgage lien of
the prior assignee and other exempt property.
33. Id. at 353, 156 So. at 717.
34. Taylor v. American Natl Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912); BatrrmTs
BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §56 at 788 (7th ed. 1948).
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However, as to his in rem right in equity to foreclose the mortgage
lien, he will probably be subordinated to the prior assignee whose
assignment was recorded.35 This result has been criticized on the
ground that it requires a separation of the debt and the security. However, the result could be justified as a compromise between the negotiable aspects of the transaction and the requirements of the statute.
It would be unusual for this situation to arise, since the mortgagee
would have to have possession of a note and mortgage that he had
previously assigned and also be able to indorse the note properly and
negotiate it.
CONCLUSION

The implication of the dictum in Bradley v. Forbs is that the Florida assignment of mortgages statute requires recordation of all
mortgage assignments to perfect them against creditors of and subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor, the mortgagee, or prior
assignees. It logically follows that all prospective purchasers of the
mortgaged land or prospective assignees of the mortgage should be
bound by, and entitled to rely on, the record. The limitation placed
on negotiability of mortgage notes is justified by a uniform rule that
reduces the possibility of fraudulent transfers to a minimum and lets
the prospective purchaser know exactly where he stands. Application
of the principal-incident rule should be used to let the character of
the secured note determine the defenses that are valid against the
assignee but not to defeat a recorded assignment.
If these conclusions are not correct, the traditional stability of
property and the commercial necessities of modern business have not
blended harmoniously. It is for the legislature to clarify the situation
by statutory amendment and bring the rights and duties of the respective parties clearly into focus.
WILLIAm

T.

SWIGERT

35. Cf. Taylor v. American Nat'l Bank, 64 Fla. 526, 60 So. 783 (1912) (involving two mortgages and a different statute). But see Foster v. Augustanna College
& Theological Seminary, 92 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 935 (1923).
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